Law on Rice

If you recall, last weekend I was feverishly working on the first draft of my independent study paper on Espinosa. That feverish work got the bones on the paper. Now, I can leisurely work through some of the more interesting issues raised by the case.

First among these leisurely reads is Prof. Pardo’s amicus brief (which I read as the Angels gave up their last gasp tonight). Prof. Pardo is a professor at the law school, and he submitted an amicus brief in Espinosa.

His argument is complex but interesting–especially for someone who likes procedure, like me.

Because section 1330 compelled the creditor, United Student Aid Funds, to object to the plan’s confirmation within 180 days, the bankruptcy court lost subject matter jurisdiction when the creditor objected to the plan ten years later. Prof. Pardo points to a recent non-bankruptcy case, Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007), authored by Justice Thomas. Here is the summary of Bowles from Westlaw:

Having failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the Federal District Court’s denial of habeas relief, petitioner Bowles moved to reopen the filing period pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6), which allows a district court to grant a 14-day extension under certain conditions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c). The District Court granted Bowles’ motion but inexplicably gave him 17 days to file his notice of appeal. He filed within the 17 days allowed by the District Court, but after the 14-day period allowed by Rule 4(a)(6) and § 2107(c). The Sixth Circuit held that the notice was untimely and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the case under this Court’s precedent. Held: Bowles’ untimely notice of appeal-though filed in reliance upon the District Court’s order-deprived the Sixth Circuit of jurisdiction.

So, on that summary alone, I think Prof. Pardo seems to have a compelling argument that Espinosa is analgous to Bowles. Or does he?